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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, THERIGHT
TO PRIVACY, AND GRASPING FOR
A MIDDLE GROUND
John J. Kappel*ON November 11, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada issued its
opinion in Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v.
United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401.1 The decision
marked the conclusion of a seven-year dispute with the striking down of
an Alberta privacy statute by a unanimous court. 2 The case originated
from a casino union's efforts to publicize a strike and resulted in a signifi-
cant increase in freedom of expression for unions, corporations, and
other organizations in Alberta.3 The first section outlines the challenged
statute and its practical effects, and the second section addresses the Su-
preme Court's decision and its implications.
I. THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION ACT
The Legislative Assembly of Alberta enacted the Personal Information
Protection Act (PIPA) in 2003.4 The official purpose of the act is to "gov-
ern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information by organi-
zations in a manner that recognizes both the right of an individual to have
his or her personal information protected and the need of organizations
to collect, use or disclose personal information for purposes that are rea-
sonable."'5 The statute was modeled after a similar Canadian federal stat-
ute passed in 2000 called the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).6
A. PROTECTING PRIVACY, PUBLICLY
Part 1 of PIPEDA creates a series of restrictions on private entities
* John graduated from Baylor University with a B.S. in Economics in 2011. He is
currently a J.D. candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law and will graduate in
May 2014.
1. Alberta (Info. & Privacy Comm'r) v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local
401, 2013 SCC 62 (Can.).
2. Id. paras. 4-5.
3. See id. paras. 4, 10.
4. Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5, (Can. Alta.).
5. Id.§3.
6. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5
(Can.).
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using personal information for commercial purposes.7 PIPEDA defines
"personal information" as "information about an identifiable individual,
but.., not... the name, title[,] or business address[,] or telephone num-
ber of an employee of an organization."8 This definition is notably quite
broad and includes a sizable amount of information that is not actually
private and may, in fact, be readily available to the public. 9 The limiting
factor of the statute's scope is therefore that the statute does not apply to
the use of personal information for noncommercial purposes rather than
a strict limitation on the type of information collected and used.' 0
B. IF You DON'T LIKE OURS YOU CAN ALWAYS MAKE YOUR OWN
PIPEDA was enacted by the Canadian Federal Government with the
intention of regulating the use of personal information in all of Canada's
ten provinces and three territories." But PIPEDA was enacted to allow
the provincial governments to displace Part 1 of PIPEDA with provincial
legislation that performs essentially the same function as Part 1 of
PIPEDA.12 The provision of PIPEDA that allows provincial legislation
to displace Part 1 of PIPEDA requires the relevant provincial legislation
to be "substantially similar" to Part 1 of PIPEDA.13 The Legislative As-
sembly of Alberta took advantage of this provision and enacted PIPA
three years after PIPEDA was enacted.14 Consequently, while Part 1 of
PIPEDA technically applies to all of Canada, it had no practical effect in
Alberta while PIPA was still valid law. 15
C. PRIVACY, PROVINCIAL STYLE
While PIPA is sufficiently similar to Part 1 of PIPEDA that none of the
courts in United Foods & Commercial Workers raised any question about
PIPA's satisfaction of the substantial similarity requirement, 16 PIPEDA
and PIPA actually have several significant differences. First, the defini-
tion of "personal information" is even broader under PIPA,' 7 including
all "information about an identifiable individual. 1 8 Second, PIPA does
not limit its regulation to private organizations involved in commercial
activity;' 9 instead, PIPA establishes a blanket general rule banning orga-
7. See id. pt. 1.
8. Id. § 2(1).
9. See id.
10. See id. § 4.
11. Id. § 26(2).
12. Id. § 26(2)(b).
13. Id.
14. Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5 (Can. Alta.).
15. See id.
16. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act § 26(2)(b); Alta.(Info. & Privacy Comm'r) v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 401,2013
SCC 62, para. 13 (Can.).
17. Compare Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act § 2(1),
with Personal Information Protection Act § 1(1)(k).
18. Personal Information Protection Act § 1(1)(k).
19. See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act § 4.
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nizations from collecting, using, or disclosing an individual's personal in-
formation without the individual's consent. 20 The term "organization" is
also defined very broadly in PIPA and includes: corporations, 2 1 unincor-
porated associations and entities,2 2 trade unions, 23 partnerships,2 4 and in-
dividuals who are functioning in a strictly commercial capacity.
25
1. Exemptions... in Excess?
To alleviate the extremity of this far-reaching rule, the statute contains
a list of exemptions.26 The Supreme Court highlighted several of the ex-
emptions as the most relevant. 27 The first exemption provides the only
substantial limitation on the scope of the definition of "organization" by
excluding an individual's actions in a "personal or domestic capacity."
2 8
Second, PIPA does not apply to personal information collected, used, or
disclosed exclusively for artistic, 2 9 literary, 30 or journalistic purposes.3 1
PIPA also has exemptions for an individual's business contact informa-
tion when used only for business purposes, 32 personal information of in-
dividuals who are candidates for or occupants of public office, 33 and for
personal information obtained as part of a legal investigation or proceed-
ing.34 There are also exemptions for old 35 and archived records, 36 and for
records of individuals deceased for at least twenty years.37 Finally, PIPA
does not apply to non-profit organizations so long as the collection, use,
and disclosure of personal information by non-profits is not done for
commercial purposes. 38
In spite of the long list of exemptions present in PIPA, there are nota-
bly no exemptions for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal infor-
mation for purposes of: (1) creating awareness of some issue among the
public or some subset of the public if the promoter is neither a non-profit
nor a journalistic entity, (2) encouraging or discouraging any particular
behavior among the public or some subset of the public if the promoter is
neither a non-profit nor a journalistic entity, and (3) providing informa-
20. See Personal Information Protection Act § 4(1).
21. Id. § 1(1)(i)(i).
22. Id. § 1(1)(i)(ii).
23. Id. § l(1)(i)(iii).
24. Id. § 1(1)(i)(iv).
25. Id. § l(l)(i)(v).
26. Id. § 4(3).
27. Alberta (Info. & Privacy Comm'r) v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local
401, 2013 SCC 62, para. 16 (Can.).
28. See Personal Information Protection Act §§ 1(1)(i)(v), 4(3)(a).
29. Id. § 4(3)(b).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 4(3)(c).
32. Id. § 4(3)(d).
33. Id. § 4(3)(m)-(o).
34. Id. § 4(3)(k).
35. Id. § 4(3)(i).
36. Id. § 4(3)6).
37. Id. § 4(3)(h).
38. Id. § 56(2)-(3).
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tion or education if the educator is neither a non-profit nor a journalistic
entity.39 The lack of exemptions for these three categories directly gave
rise to United Food & Commercial Workers and the striking down of
PIPA.40
II. UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
United Food & Commercial Workers (UFCW) is a union that repre-
sents workers at the Palace Casino at West Edmonton Mall in Alberta. 41
UFCW conducted a 305 day-long strike in 2006, during which both
UFCW and the casino filmed and photographed UFCW's picket line near
the main entrance to the casino.42 UFCW posted signs near their picket
line indicating that images of people crossing the picket line would be
uploaded to a website. 43
Unsurprisingly, a number of individuals were not particularly happy
about UFCW's recording and publication of them and complained to the
Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner that UFCW's actions had
violated PIPA. 44 Individuals claiming that UFCW recorded them in-
cluded casino employees, casino customers, and members of the public
who just happened to be near the casino during the strike.45
B. APPLYING, BUT NOT QUESTIONING PIPA
Alberta Information and Privacy Commissioner appointed an Adjudi-
cator to determine if UFCW had violated any of PIPA's provisions by
"collecting, using and disclosing personal information about individuals
without their consent."' 46 During the Adjudicator's review of UFCW's
conduct, UFCW claimed that it had filmed the picket line to: (1) create
awareness of the strike among union members, (2) create public aware-
ness of the strike, (3) discourage people from crossing the picket line, (4)
deter potential acts of violence from non-picketers, (5) deter theft of
union property, (6) document the occurrence and peaceful nature of the
picketing, (7) support morale of the picketers, and (8) create material for
union training and education. 47
UFCW argued that its conduct should be found to fall within either the
journalistic or legal proceeding exemptions to PIPA.48 The Adjudicator
39. See Alberta (info. & Privacy Comm'r) v. United Food & Commercial Workers,
Local 401, 2013 SCC 62, para. 6 (Can.).
40. See id. paras. 6, 41.
41. Id. para. 4.
42. Id.
43. Id. Amusingly, the website UFCW used to publish images of people crossing their
picket line was titled "www.casinoscabs.ca." Id.
44. Id. para. 5.
45. Id.




rejected these contentions on the grounds that UFCW's actions were pri-
marily rooted in financial gain and the commercial success of its mem-
bers. 49 This aspect of commerciality precluded UFCW's use of the legal
proceeding and journalistic exemptions. 50 The Adjudicator ultimately
found that none of PIPA's exemptions were applicable to UFCW's ac-
tions and that UFCW had therefore violated PIPA.
5 1
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Unhappy with the Adjudicator's decision, UFCW sought judicial re-
view. 52 Rather than attempting to argue that the Adjudicator misinter-
preted or misapplied PIPA, UFCW chose instead to argue that PIPA
violated section 2 of The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter). 5 3
UFCW was unable to make this. argument before the Adjudicator due to
the limits of the Adjudicator's jurisdiction. 54 section 2 of the Charter pro-
vides, among other things, a right of freedom of expression guaranteed to
everyone, including non-natural legal persons such as unions. 55
The Court of the Queen's Bench of Alberta determined that PIPA un-
doubtably restricted UFCW's freedom of expression. 56 The court further
determined that said restriction was not justified as a reasonable limita-
tion under section 1 of the Charter 57 and that PIPA was therefore in vio-
lation of the Charter.58  The Alberta Information and Privacy
Commissioner appealed the lower court's ruling to the Alberta Court of
Appeal, which reached the same decision. 59 The Alberta Information
and Privacy Commissioner chose to appeal the Alberta Court of Appeal's
decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.60 Unfortunately for the Com-
missioner, the third time turned out not to be the charm and the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the two lower courts. 61
D. A DISPROPORTIONATE INFRINGEMENT OF EXPRESSION
The Supreme Court readily agreed with the two lower courts, without
much in the way of analysis, that at least some of UFCW's conduct pro-
hibited by PIPA constituted expression under section 2 of the Charter.62




52. Id. para. 7.
53. Id.
54. Id. para. 6.
55. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 2(b) (U.K.).
56. United Food & Commercial Workers, 2013 SCC 62, para. 7.
57. Id.; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § I (U.K.).
58. United Food & Commercial Workers, 2013 SCC 62, para. 7.
59. Id. para. 8.
60. See id.
61. Id. para. 3.
62. Id. para. 10.
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whether the restrictions placed on UFCW's freedom of expression by
PIPA were reasonable. 63 The Supreme Court ultimately came to the con-
clusion that while PIPA created numerous demonstrable benefits, the
price of those benefits was far too high. 64 The disproportionate relation-
ship between the benefits to privacy rights and the cost to freedom of
expression caused the court to find that PIPA violated section 2 of the
Charter.65
As a result of this analysis the Supreme Court struck down PIPA in its
entirety. 66 A partial striking of the statute could have sufficed under
these circumstances, but Alberta Information actually requested that the
court strike the whole law rather than take a piecemeal approach.67
E. ALBERTA AFTER UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS
The full range of effects of the Supreme Court's decision is not immedi-
ately clear. PIPA will remain valid law until November 13, 2014,68 and
will cease to be valid after that point. 69 If the Alberta legislature does not
enact a new privacy law, then PIPEDA will once again become active law
in Alberta. Because the Alberta legislature chose to enact PIPA to dis-
place PIPEDA in the first place, it would seem unlikely that they would
now be satisfied with PIPEDA. The only alternative is for the Alberta
legislature to enact a new privacy law to replace PIPA. Doing so may
prove to be a challenging task because the legislature will be seeking to
strike a delicate balance. PIPEDA prevents Alberta from enacting any
privacy laws less restrictive than PIPEDA and too restrictive of a privacy
law runs the risk of violating section 2 of the Charter. Exemptions for
unions are a must for PIPA's possible replacement, but it remains unclear
whether the United Food and Commercial Workers decision requires ex-
emptions for other groups.
63. Id. paras. 18-25.
64. Id. para. 25.
65. Id.
66. Id. para. 40.
67. Id.
68. Id. para. 41.
69. Id.
